Abstract:

In the 18 months since the start of President Donald Trump’s second term, the United States has adopted a comparatively more adventurous foreign policy than his first term, leaving several unknowns surrounding what the US’ global role and reputation will be in 2028. This article compares this adventurism with a past administration – President Richard Nixon – to predict these unknowns. Using government archival sources, academic scholarship, and analysis, this article contends that, like post-Nixon, the US’ global economic and political importance will outweigh reputational damage by 2028.

Introduction:

Fifty years ago, Jimmy Carter was elected President of the United States. His election was due in part to voters’ lack of trust in the Executive Branch following unpopular and secretive foreign policy during President Richard Nixon’s administration, the Watergate Scandal, and President Gerald Ford’s pardoning of Nixon. As the 2028 election approaches, the United States finds itself in a similar position to that of 1976. Foreign policy in President Donald Trump’s administration is conducted like the Nixon administration by using foreign policy to empower voting blocs. Through this similarity, we can analyse the effects of current foreign policy in the US global role while also providing an argument on how it may influence the 2028 presidential elections.

The Nixon Administration and 1970s Covert Operations:

Between 1968–1976, United States foreign policy was run almost exclusively through the Executive Office. The Nixon Doctrine suggested responsibility for protecting allies would no longer rest on the United States, while realistically it continued to protect against global communist threats through subterfuge. In National Security Decision Memorandum 40, published 17 February 1970, Nixon stated covert actions by the CIA would supplement overt foreign activities of the United States (Office of the Historian, 1970). This rescinded NSC 5412/2, which had previously given oversight to covert actions since 1961 (Central Intelligence Agency, 1961). Under the new directive, more license was given to Nixon’s “imperial presidency”, the term coined by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1973) to describe the Executive Branch’s distancing from constitutional checks and balances to enforce secretive and unilateral foreign policy.

Between NSDM 40 and the War Powers Resolution in November 1973, which requires congressional approval for any foreign military actions (Congress, 2025), Nixon used covert operations to redesign world orders while appearing to adhere to détente’s peaceful conditions.

Presidents before and after Nixon have used covert foreign operations as means to an end: President George W. Bush used the notorious Abu Ghraib torture prison; President Eisenhower was involved in the assassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1961; and operations targeting Osama bin Laden were heavily present from President George H.W. Bush to President Obama. However, the Nixon administration was unparalleled in the global scale of its operations. In Latin America, Nixon successfully instructed the CIA to promote a coup d’état against elected Chilean President Salvador Allende without National Security Council approval (National Security Archive, 1970). Across Southeast Asia, Vietnamization policy was carried out to train South Vietnamese soldiers to “take over responsibility for their own defense,” (Hughes, 2023) yet the administration secretly carried out secret bombing campaigns in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia while also invading Cambodia in Operation Freedom Deal (1970). Building up to the 1971 India-Pakistan War, Nixon breached policy against military sales and arms shipments to Pakistan, sending upwards of $14.9 million between March–November 1971 according to the US Comptroller General’s 1972 Annual Report (United States Government Accountability Office, 1973, pp. 79–80). The administration also used secrecy and clandestine operations to quell domestic pressures; Operation CHAOS unlawfully spied on Americans and created a 300,000-name list of American “radicals” with anti-war or communist beliefs (Central Intelligence Agency, 19 May 1976). While it could be considered these actions enough to provoke campaigns to restrict his power, Nixon’s “silent majority” voting bloc empowered and maintained the “imperial presidency”, at least until Congress stepped in with the 1973 War Powers Resolution. The “imperial presidency” was directly propped up by the voters who proudly saw the US as a strong global peacekeeper against communism.

The Trump Administration and Foreign Operations since 2025:

It is this voter support for foreign policy that is most similar in the Trump presidency, with the MAGA bloc falling behind their commander-in-chief as they see actions that, on the surface level, seek to protect American values. The administration’s actions against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro provide a key example. MAGA voters saw Venezuela as a hotbed of violent gangs, terrorists, and drug traffickers who could destabilize the American social order (Salvanto et al., 2026), leading to 97% of MAGA voters supporting the American intervention and removal of Maduro. Likewise, Nixon’s silent majority saw invading and bombing Cambodia as legitimate prevention of Communist enemies, perceived as a direct threat to US citizens (Louis Harris & Associates, 1970). Under the UN Charter, which prohibits military force against one state by another, the Venezuela operation violated international law (Shaw, 2026). It also went against Trump’s own 2024 campaign promise to not start wars, but the appearance of actively protecting American interests overseas justified the operation to Trump voters.

The Trump Doctrine:

The “Trump Corollary”, or Doctrine, has certainly impacted global diplomacy and created international crises in pursuing economic and security strategies, including violations of international law, direct military action, and withdrawals from international organisations. The difference between it and the Nixon Doctrine is mainly structural. Nixon’s foreign policy was multifaceted, including strategic advisors like Henry Kissinger, Melvin Laird, and Alexander Haig; in juxtaposition, Trump’s foreign policy is argued to be “broken” and “dysfunctional”, desiring loyalty over “expertise and experience” (Kurtzer & Miller, 2026, para. 2; Ashley, 2026). Since its introduction, the Trump Doctrine has sought to balance America First isolationism with expansion of Monroe Doctrine interventionism and American military adventurism to gain quick, symbolic wins overseas that resonate with his base, from Nigeria to Venezuela (The White House, 2025; Rumley & Groeling, 2025). For example, the administration took military action against ISIS (U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, 2025) as a response to Nigerian Christians being killed by what President Trump described as “radical Islamists” (Trump [@realDonaldTrump], 2025). Regarding alliances, Trump actively threatened to acquire Greenland and joked about Canada becoming the 51st state. He backed away from the United Nations while also monetising the Board of Peace initiative, which has implications of peace as something to “buy”. Maduro’s removal from office in favour of Delcy Rodriguez by the US has so far been a long-lasting win for the administration as it benefits from billions in oil revenue (Gibbons, 2026), though Venezuelan citizens continue to suffer from unchanged authoritarian systems (Dib, 2026). The United States seems detached from the realities of multilateralism, especially in recent policy regarding the war in Iran, where it appears bullishness does not work in long-term international relations.

Impacts have ranged from Tehran hardening policies and negotiations, US oil prices significantly rising by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz (Saunokonoko & Ambrose, 2026), and the passing of the War Powers Resolution by the House of Representatives to end a war that has continued to falsely be heralded as “victorious” by administration figures (McLeary, 2026) and has cost upwards of $100 billion for Americans according to a Forbes estimate (Pringle, 2026). Significant long-term costs in Operation Epic Fury (Byman, 2026), along with those in other theatres, are starkly different to the effectiveness of Nixon’s foreign policy strategies.

Predicting the US Global Role in 2028:

Even considering costs of the administration’s orchestrated chaos, it can be supposed that, without extreme escalations, the United States’ global role in 2028 will be essentially unchanged, even following the above bombing campaigns, military incursions, and threats to allies. Though a CSIS report identifies the shift in NATO defense responsibility towards European countries and away from the US as a positive development, it highlights that success hinges on a “managed transition” (Cha & Szechenyi & Todman, 2025, p. 21) rather than instantaneously. Outside Europe, the report highlights how strained relationships have challenged how other allies develop their international and domestic policies due to an American “transactional foreign policy approach” (Ibid, p. 5). Nonetheless, the United States’ global economic and political importance overrides concerns over transactional diplomacy. The economic effects of the administration pulling out of international organisations and aid initiatives highlight this: the US was responsible for 20% ($1.2 million) of WHO funding in 2023 (WHO, December 2023); the US was allocated to pay 22% ($820 million) of the UN budget in 2025 (Ferragamo & Roy, 2025); and Oxfam states 95 million people could lose access to healthcare due to dismantling USAID’s $63 billion budget (Oxfam America, 2026). The CSIS report found allies are likely to either curry favour with the administration or wait for a more reliable partner to appear rather than immediately decouple from the United States. Comparatively, allies found the US unreliable in economic and military security during the Nixon Doctrine but could not risk protection from communist victory. Carter’s reassurances that the US would reinitiate a multilateral foreign policy effectively relegated Nixon’s foreign actions to the past, at least from a “large power” perspective. American multilateralism became king in the Carter administration, as new relations emerged with China, Egypt, Panama, and the United Nations. A United States with a multilateral mindset in 2029 can likewise reverse Trump’s transactional foreign policy.

The 2028 Presidential Election – Similarities to the 1976 Presidential Election

The question remains: How can one predict the return to a United States multilateral foreign policy? The answer lies in the 1976 Presidential Election, in which distrust of the incumbent and presidential scandal were all factors in President Ford’s loss to President Carter (Apple Jr., 1976), who then made multilateralism a key part of his administration (Mann, 2021).

Nixon’s Legacy Impairing Ford in 1976

Looking at the 1976 race, the Ford administration maintained a link to the Watergate Scandal, while the Carter campaign asserted itself as an advocate of morality in politics and anti-Washington feeling. Carter had begun his campaign two years prior and was seen as a Washington outsider, cleansing him of the distrust voters had of career politicians to contribute 31% of his total vote (Teeter, 1977). Of all anti-Ford voters that voted for Carter (19%), seven points related to Watergate (Ibid). Though this was not the main reason for his victory, it certainly indicated that scandal and unpopular reputations might not achieve electoral victory. Ford was never able to recover his strong initial 71% approval rating in August 1974, dropping to 50% following his controversial pardoning of Nixon that September and falling to 37% at the beginning of 1975 (Saad, 2017). Between this scandal, the general anti-Washington public feeling, and Ford’s election debate gaffe of falsely claiming there was “no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe” (Commission on Presidential Debates, 1976, para. 19), polls favoured Carter in running the government (43% to 37%) and in economic issues like reducing employment (58% to 22%) or cost of living (43% to 36%) (Teeter, 1977), while Ford maintained a below average 45-50% approval rating in the months before the election (Jones, 2006).

Comparatively, a recent Reuters/Ipsos poll (April 2026) shows around 60% disapproval ratings for Trump’s presidency, 50-60% disapproval of Iran policy, 56% disapproval on following rule of law, and 58% disapproval of handling corruption, statistics Democrats can take positives from. Should this continue, it is likely to provide a similarly negative response to the Republican candidate in 2028 and propel a Democrat forward in the election and a return to multilateralism.

Trump’s Legacy Impairing Republicans in 2028

The Republican Party’s currently unbreakable allegiance to Trump is likely to curtail it in presidential election season similarly to how party reputation impacted Ford. While Ford was curtailed by distrust of career politicians because of Watergate and Nixon’s secretive foreign policy, the 2028 Republican candidate may be curtailed by Trump’s overwhelming control of the party. Recent primaries have seen Trump-endorsed candidates winning over “outsider” (Cooper et al., 2026) Republicans like Jared Hudson in his defeat by Barry Moore in Alabama or in Ed Gallrein’s win over Thomas Massie in Kentucky. These victories display a trend in Republican politicians’ politics during the Trump era: they win when they follow a MAGA party line. With Trump as the ideological head of the party, there is little room for non-MAGA politics from now until 2028. Complete separation from an incumbent during a presidential election is difficult, as Ford found out in 1976 (considering he “took over” from Nixon in 1974). It is increasingly difficult when the current Republican political currency runs through MAGA appeal and the main proponent of that appeal is unable to run for a third term. Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have emerged as Republican frontrunners, but they lack Trump’s influence, personality, and popularity in the Republican Party and MAGA voter bloc (Grobe, 2026**).** An opinion article in The Hill also emphasizes the factor of a potential MAGA drop-off in the election as a hindrance to the Republican candidate (Alexander & Cunningham, 2025). The amalgamation of Trump’s declining approval polls, alignment between Trump and the Republican Party, and potential MAGA drop-off with a non-Trump nominee as described above will likely challenge Vance, Rubio, and other contenders to successfully appeal to voters. As a consequence, this could give Democrats an advantage in the Presidential race, and, if successful, could increase the likelihood of a renewed interest in multilateral diplomacy. Though, as with every election, it remains unpredictable.

Conclusion

In comparing Trump and Nixon, we see two presidents who kept their cards close to their chests and ran foreign policy through the Executive Office. Their voting blocs supported their policies because the operations sent a message of American strength against imminent threats and directly appealed to their voters. American allies could not afford criticising the US because of the vital protection it gave against Soviet, Chinese, and other communist nations during the Cold War. Today, though the Cold War has long ended, the story has not changed. Allies maintained their alliances then and will continue to do so by 2028 as military and economic security necessities overpower concerns with American unilateralism. Lastly, one other aspect taken from the comparison with Nixon (and Ford) is the consequences of adventurist foreign policy for presidential elections. Negative opinions of Ford in 1976 stemmed from controversial foreign policy in the Nixon administration and through Watergate, eventually contributing to Carter’s successful campaign. Similar negativity surrounding Trump’s foreign policy and controversial actions could lead to a similar outcome in the 2028 election. Naturally, there are limitations to this analysis, both in the unpredictability of political elections and in comparing elections in the 1970s to the 2020s. Government statistics (United States Census Bureau, 1978; 2025) show that 54% of all eligible voters voted in 1976 compared to 73.6% in 2024, while presidential campaign spending has increased from $45 million (Federal Election Commission, 1977) to $5.5 billion (Grabenstein, 2024) in the same period. It would be best to analyse the connections in 2028, but it is still useful to keep in mind while analysing foreign policy developments.

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