Nigeria continues to grapple with a multidimensional security crisis that impacts all regions of the country. While the natures of the threats have evolved, their intensity and geographic spread have increased over the past decade, overwhelming state capacity and eroding public trust. Over the past decade, the actors, tactics, motivations, and strategies have all evolved. Yet one constant remains: the Nigerian government’s persistent inability, or unwillingness, to respond effectively and systematically to improve its security issues. 

In recent weeks, the United States has publicly expressed concern regarding terrorist violence in northern Nigeria and has also launched a Tomahawk missile strike in Sokoto state. Reactions within Nigeria and the international community have been mixed, underscoring ongoing uncertainty around the coordination of U.S.-Nigeria security cooperation and the interest of the US in the region¹. 

One thing is that Trump has finally gotten the Nigerian government to take action on the security crisis in the nation, something that no one has been able to do in the last couple of years, and for the first time under this new Tinubu administration. 

Background 

Nigeria’s security crisis manifests across five distinct² but interconnected threats:

1. Jihadist Insurgency in the Northeast 

2. Farmer-Herder Violence in the Middle Belt 

3. Banditry and mass Kidnapping in the Northwest 

4. Separatism in the Southeast 

5. Militancy and criminal oil theft in the Niger Delta 

The casualties of these crises have reached exuberant numbers. Over 3 million people have been displaced in the past 8 years, with 80,000 people affected³. The conflict has only intensified over 

the years, with 2,266 people killed by insurgents or armed bandits in the first half of 2025⁴; this number surpasses the total number of casualties for all of 2024, and in 2025, 30,000 bandits are currently operating in loosely organized groups that evolved from resource disputes into actors capable of mass abduction and high-casualty attacks⁵. 

The 2024 Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Index scores Nigeria 96.6 out of 120, ranking it 15th out of 179 countries globally. This places Nigeria in the “Alert” category and indicates high 

vulnerability and significant risk of conflict or collapse. This reflects a high level of state fragility driven by economic insecurity, stress, and governance failure as Nigeria’s fragility score declined by 1.4 from the previous year⁶. 

Not only is the security crisis of Nigeria leading to the deaths of Nigerians and the displacement of more, but the security crisis is also affecting the economic growth of Nigeria. There is a negative correlation between increased insurgency and lowering unemployment rate, foreign direct investment, and funding towards education⁷. 

The Stressors 

1. Poverty: Poverty due to the lack of government programs has given a space for insurgent groups to recruit. 

2. Environmental issues: Desertification in Northern Nigeria, as well as actions from ISWAP and Boko-Haram in burning farmland, have contributed to limited resources for herders and farmers. These limited resources in the north have pushed herders in the north further south and, as a result, created clashes with farmers. 

3. Ethnic Fractionalization: Borders created by the British and colonization structures have created a lot of division between ethnic groups in Nigeria, as well as the Northern and Southern regions. 

4. Religious tensions: The distribution of Muslims and Christians has caused division in how certain policies are implemented and clashes with religious beliefs. 

Why This Matters: Strategic Implications 

As Africa's most populous nation (over 220 million people) and largest economy, Nigeria's instability threatens West African security, global oil markets, and international counterterrorism efforts. The country's fragility creates opportunities for transnational terrorist networks, generates refugee flows, destabilizes neighbors, and undermines democratic governance across the region. As the Sahel region continues to grapple with coups, the stability of Nigeria and other West African countries is paramount to democratic resilience. 

The Spending Paradox 

With approximately 10% of Nigeria's GDP affected by its current security crisis⁸ and foreign investment cratering by almost 70 per cent after President Trump labelled Nigeria as a country of particular concern, immediate and deliberate action must be taken to effectively address these stressors to secure the development of Nigeria. From May 2023 to April 2024 alone, kidnapping has affected 4.14 million households in Nigeria⁹, and ransom payments have accumulated to $1.4 billion USD ( ₦2.23 trillion)¹⁰. Oil theft alone costs Nigeria between $7 billion and $12 billion in lost revenue¹¹. 

Despite security spending reaching $4.1 billion USD (₦6.57 trillion) in 2025, violence intensifies rather than diminishes, which indicates a fundamental strategic failure¹². Though Nigeria has allocated 12% of its 2025 budget on security spending, about 65% of the budget is consumed by personnel costs, leaving limited resources for capabilities¹³. 

In the same vein, there is also a personnel issue in Nigeria. The Nigerian Armed Forces have roughly 230,000 active personnel. The Nigeria Police Force has about 370,000 officers, but fewer than 300,000 are deployable due to VIP protection, administrative duties, and obsolete deployment models. In total, barely 600,000 security personnel are tasked with safeguarding 225 million Nigerians across 2,514.689 miles of land borders and 530 miles of coastline. Nigeria 

currently operates at a police to citizen ratio of roughly 1 officer for every 636 citizens, far below the United Nations’ recommended 1:454 standard¹⁴. 

Analysis 

Nigeria’s security failures and continued escalating violence reflect a state-centered system, adopting a military-first approach and actively neglecting a human-centered approach. Nigeria’s security challenges continue to persist, but not due to insufficient funding alone. The inability of the Nigerian government to actively address its security challenges has led to the stalled 

development and increased fragility of the nation. There is a negative correlation between insecurity, unemployment rate, domestic capital formation, foreign direct investment, government security, and education, which are all impacted as the security challenge continues to grow. 

This correlation sheds light on why Nigeria has struggled to adequately resolve its insecurity challenges. With a military-first approach rather than a human-centered approach, Nigeria continues to ignore the root causes. 41.3 per cent of Nigeria’s urban population¹⁵ and 75.5 per cent of the rural population¹⁶ live below the poverty line. In the same vein, in the first quarter of 2024, unemployment stood at 5.3 percent, which represented a third consecutive increase since the second quarter of 2023¹⁷. 

So, although military operations may temporarily suppress violence, they simply cannot eliminate the recruitment pool or adequately address the underlying conditions enabling insurgency, separatism, and criminality to thrive. The system in Nigeria is broken, and Nigerians continue to feel strong levels of grievance with their government’s inability to provide basic needs for its people and continue to evade transparency and accountability. 

A clear example of this is the aftermath of the U.S airstrike in northeast Nigeria. The news was broken by Donald Trump on Truth Social, which was then followed by a statement by the Minister of foreign affair Ambassador Yusuf Maitama Tuggar and the President Bola Ahmed Tinubu claiming it was a joint effort, however, till date details about the mission, the intelligence, its outcome and the collaboration between the Nigeria and the US have been kept a secret. 

Recommendations 

Nigeria's security crisis demands a comprehensive response that addresses both immediate threats and underlying systemic failures. It is simply not enough to focus on military action to address these multidimensional security challenges. These recommendations provide actionable pathways for meaningful reform across governance, economic development, community engagement, and regional security. 

First, meaningful governance reform is essential. Increased defense spending without transparency has failed to yield improved security outcomes and has instead reinforced public distrust. The government should publish detailed quarterly reports on security spending and procurement, establish an independent oversight mechanism that includes civil society participation, and adopt digital procurement systems to reduce corruption. Security leadership should be evaluated based on measurable performance indicators, with promotions and tenure tied to demonstrated improvements. Nigeria also must transition towards community-centered security. The country’s centralized security structure fails to fit Nigeria’s complexities and leaves 

communities without effective protection. Expanding state and community policing, with federal oversight, would improve responsiveness and intelligence gathering. Officers should receive training in conflict mediation and community engagement. Adequate compensation, equipment, and welfare for security personnel are also necessary to improve morale and professionalism. 

Second, economic exclusion, particularly among Nigeria's large youth population, needs to be addressed. Persistent unemployment and underinvestment have created fertile ground for insurgency, banditry, and criminal networks to claim legitimacy. The government should scale youth employment programs linked to infrastructure development, environmental restoration, and technology. Expanding access to quality education in conflict-affected regions and investing in rural and regional infrastructure, including the Niger Delta and Southeast, would reduce inequality and grievances. In the Niger Delta specifically, economic justice must be prioritized through transparent revenue sharing and community-led development initiatives. 

Third, environmental degradation and climate change must be recognized as central drivers of violence, particularly in Northern and Middle Belt regions. Desertification has intensified farmer–herder conflict and displacement, as well as created easy crossing points for insurgent groups. Accelerating the Great Green Wall initiative, expanding land restoration programs, and employing internally displaced persons and local communities in these efforts would address both poverty and environmental stress. Supporting sedentary livestock systems, agricultural intensification, and climate-resilient farming practices would reduce competition over land and help in addressing Nigeria’s food sovereignty challenges. 

Fourth, Nigeria’s Northern borders must be secured through a combination of technology, coordination, and integrity, and move away from relying solely on personnel-intensive approaches that are vulnerable to corruption. A dedicated and professional border security force, separate from conventional military units and subject to strict oversight, would improve effectiveness. Bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries such as Niger, Chad, and Cameroon should be strengthened, alongside economic incentives for border communities to resist infiltration. This poses challenges due to the Coups occurring in the region, but it is essential for the security and sovereignty of all border nations. 

Fifth, long-term stability requires reconciliation, social cohesion, and reintegration. Unresolved grievances rooted in colonial legacies, political exclusion, and communal trauma continue to fuel violence. There is a need to pilot truth and reconciliation processes in conflict-affected communities that would provide a structured platform for healing and accountability. Institutionalizing interfaith and interethnic dialogue at state and local levels, expanding victim support and trauma care, and implementing structured reintegration programs for repentant

combatants that are anchored in community participation are critical for breaking cycles of violence. 

Finally, political inclusion and federal reform are necessary to address persistent marginalization, particularly in the Southeast. Equitable resource allocation, targeted infrastructure investment, and the development of regional economic hubs would help counter separatist mobilization. A national dialogue on fiscal federalism and decentralization, including potential constitutional reforms expanding state autonomy, would provide legitimate channels for addressing long-standing grievances and strengthening national cohesion. 

Conclusion 

Nigeria’s security crisis is not merely a failure of force projection but a failure of governance legitimacy. Without transparency, accountability, and a decisive shift toward human-centered security, military gains will remain temporary, and instability will continue to reproduce itself across regions and generations. 

The Nigerian government has taken steps to address these issues in the form of increased security personnel recruitment and wanting to raise the penalty for those linked to crimes like kidnapping¹⁸. However, it is not enough to simply say these things; there needs to be active steps taken to address the root causes founded on legitimate grievances of the government not putting its citizens first, massive issues with corruption, and the inability to execute justice in a transparent and accountable way. 

Citations:

1 Fadel, L., & Akinwotu, E. (2025, December 26). U.S. strikes ISIS targets in Nigeria. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2025/12/26/nx-s1-5657440/u-s-strikes-isis-targets-in-nigeria

2 Tanko, A. (2021, July 18). Nigeria’s security crises - five different threats. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57860993 

3 Amalu, N. S. (2016). Impact of boko haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria. Global Journal of Social Sciences, 14(1), 35. https://doi.org/10.4314/gjss.v14i1.4 

4 Nigeria. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2025, November 14). 

https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/nigeria/

5 Tejeda, G. (2025, August 22). From criminality to insurgency: The convergence of bandits and Jihadists in Nigeria’s Northwest. The Soufan Center. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-august-22/ 6 The Fund for Peace. (2022). Country dashboard. Fragile States Index. Retrieved December 10, 2022, from https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/ 

7 Yusuf, A., & Mohd, S. (2022). Growth and Fiscal Effects of Insecurity on the Nigerian Economy. The European journal of development research, 1–27. Advance online publication. 

https://doi.org/10.1057/s41287-022-00531-3 

Newspapers. https://punchng.com/nigerians-paid-n2-23tn-as-ransom-in-12-months-nbs/ 10 Edekin, J. (2024, December 20). Two million people kidnapped and $1.4 billion paid in ransoms in Nigeria in one year: NBS. Ground News. 

https://ground.news/article/two-million-kidnapped-14-billion-paid-in-ransoms-in-nigeria-nbs 11 Oladosu, R. (2019, July 11). Nigeria loses $12bn annually to oil theft, stakeholders seek FG action. Economic Confidential. https://economicconfidential.com/12bn-lost-annually-oil-theft/ 

12 Nigeria’s defence budget (2022–2025/2026) and security outcomes. Modern Ghana . (2025, December 20).https://www.modernghana.com/news/1458203/nigerias-defence-budget-202220252026-and-secu.htm l 

13 Enome, B. (2025, December 23). Yabagi Sani: Nigeria in trouble because government is economical with the truth . Arise News 

.https://www.arise.tv/yabagi-sani-nigeria-in-trouble-because-government-is-economical-with-the-truth/ 

14 Momoh, C. (2025, November 11). Over 100,000 Policemen for VIPs: Nigeria’s Security Priorities Betray Citizens. Punch Newspapers. https://punchng.com/over-100000-policemen-assigned-to-vips-eu-report/15 NESG Admin. (2024, September 30). The Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG). NESG. https://www.nesgroup.org/blog/Nigeria%E2%80%99s-unemployment-rate-increased-further-in-2024Q1 16 Tunji, S. (2025, May 4). Poverty rate among rural Nigerians now 75% – W’Bank. Punch Newspapers. https://punchng.com/poverty-rate-among-rural-nigerians-now-75-wbank/ 

17 NESG Admin. (2024, September 30). The Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG). NESG. https://www.nesgroup.org/blog/Nigeria%E2%80%99s-unemployment-rate-increased-further-in-2024Q1 

18 Yusuf, K. (2025, November 29). Six key measures outlined by Tinubu to tackle Nigeria’s insecurity. Premium Times Nigeria. 

https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/838808-six-key-measures-outlined-by-tinubu-to-tackle nigerias-insecurity.html