1.     Over the past two decades, when facing international crises, American policymakers have increasingly come to rely on sanctions as their foreign policy measure of first resort. At first glance, this choice is reasonable. However, the ways in which sanctions have been used in recent years express a clear lack of strategic thought, and the continuation of this type of behavior risks severely weakening their efficacy going forward. In order to ensure that sanctions are a tool that furthers American interests, the American government needs to overhaul the way that it uses sanctions, and develop a new approach modeled on the Powell Doctrine in military affairs. Such an approach will eschew overuse and embrace a model in which sanctions are imposed overwhelmingly, infrequently, in the service of vital and discrete goals, and with the support of allies and the American public. Additionally, the U.S. must create the bureaucratic capacity to plan and ensure that sanctions are imposed in a strategic and deliberate manner.

2.     America’s geopolitical position places it in an awkward bind. Given its preeminence among nations in the post-Cold War environment, American policymakers feel an obligation to respond to violations in the international order in a way that the leaders of other states do not. This drive to “do something” has led policymakers to increasingly reach for sanctions as their tool of first resort. On the surface this is a reasonable pattern. Sanctions are seen as an effective and flexible tool to voice displeasure and punish malign actors in the international environment, while avoiding the costs in treasure and life that military responses entail. They are a quick and malleable response that asserts America’s position in the international sphere and are flexible, under the discretion of the executive branch, require minimal resources to implement, and can cause severe pain to their targets. However, sanctions have seldom been able to lead to the desired changes and their use is increasingly becoming counterproductive.

3.     The objectives of sanctions can be grouped under 3 categories: stigmatization, attrition, and coercion(1).  When the American government imposes sanctions, it is usually under the stated aim of using coercion to attain a desired end, but this rarely succeeds. There are currently five countries under comprehensive sanctions, and dozens more in which leaders are under targeted sanctions(2)  Few if any of these targets show signs of capitulating to American demands. There are several interwoven factors that have played a role in these failures. The most common mistake has been to set unrealistic objectives. For example, U.S. sanctions against Cuba aim to achieve regime change, but no matter what level of pain is inflicted on Cuba’s population, it is unlikely that the country’s leaders would ever accept the end of their rule. This does not mean that economic pain can never be used as a lever to create change in the political sphere, but it does demand that realistic objectives be set. Additionally, targets of sanctions must have a clear understanding that their acquiescence to American demands will result in positive results for them.

4. The next mistake is a corollary to the first; any sanctions imposed must have effects that are commensurate to the intended objective. For sanctions to have a chance of success as a coercive tool, the damage that they cause must be devastating enough to change the calculus of the adversary. The final pathology present in American sanctions policy is the fear of imposing costs on American citizens. In the aftermath of American debacles in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, American leaders have become increasingly insecure with regards to the willingness of the American population to sacrifice for foreign policy objectives. This has substantially hindered recent attempts to punish adversaries, as even the notion of rising oil prices has stayed the hand of American presidents who wanted to respond to malign activity on the part of Russia or Iran. Thus, to impose the level of sanctions that would be necessary to achieve the desired ends of American policymakers, political leaders will need to convince the American public that the resulting cost is worth the goal. The relevance of this factor has increased dramatically and will continue to do so, as the targets of American sanctions transition from small states with minor roles in the global economy to larger powers such as Russia and China. Admittedly, meeting the aforementioned criteria for success will substantially limit the frequency with which America can impose sanctions. Thus, it is recommended that America adopt a framework for its sanctions policy modeled after the famed Powell Doctrine.

5.     One of the greatest misconceptions of the Powell Doctrine is that it states that America should engage in military confrontations with overwhelming force to achieve a quick and decisive victory. While this is certainly an element of the doctrine, it is not its primary feature. Rather, the Powell Doctrine seeks to limit the overuse of military force by setting a series of constraints which must be cleared before turning to military means, and when these tools are used, they are done so in a manner that is appropriate to the desired ends. The eight questions that must be answered in the affirmative before resorting to force are:

1. Is a vital national-security interest threatened?

2. Do we have a clear and attainable objective?

3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?

4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?

5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?

6. Have the consequences of US action been fully considered?

7. Is the action supported by the American people?

8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

6.     The sanctions leading to the JCPOA are the most successful example to date of using sanctions to achieve an objective through coercion(3). The sanctions against Iran met all the parameters of the Powell Doctrine. Most notably: international support, an attainable objective, a vital national security interest, and an exit strategy. This allowed the Obama administration to inflict truly draconian sanctions on Iran. However, even with these parameters being met, the Obama administration’s success required the internal political dynamics of Iran to be amenable to change. The sanctions regime that was implemented succeeded by causing a recession that then led to a moderate being elected on a platform of achieving a deal that would lead to sanctions being lifted. This understanding of the political reality is essential to the sanctions' success. This is elucidated by the Trump administration’s attempts to impose a “maximum pressure campaign” which would bring Iran back to the negotiating table. Trump’s policies did not consider that by withdrawing from the JCPOA, America was actively weakening the political faction that would be willing to negotiate, while strengthening hardliners who had no interest in coming to an agreement with the U.S. In fact, since the reimplementation of sanctions on Iran these hardliners have increasingly benefitted financially from a shadow economy built off of sanctions evasion(4).

7.     The increased use of sanctions has also led to America’s adversaries to increasingly invest in derisking and sanction-proofing measures. Despite China’s CIPS platform not currently being used widely as a replacement for SWIFT, the fact that China has built the platform and is establishing it as a part of the nation’s financial infrastructure shows that it is developing contingency plans in case America decides to cut off Chinese financial institutions from SWIFT in response to a future geopolitical crisis(5). Similarly, Russia’s dedollarisation policy after 2014 could have severely limited the U.S.’ ability to impose costs on Russia(6). Fortunately, Putin did not think that the EU would ever freeze Russian assets, and thus he failed to protect his economy from the drastic steps that European policymakers took. However, it is unlikely that American adversaries will make this same mistake again. Thus, overuse is a clear threat to the efficacy of sanctions going forward.

8.     Sanctions are also suffering from an erosion of their attritive capacities. It is undeniable that American sanctions have the capacity to severely weaken the economies of targeted states. Even seemingly moderate sanctions imposed on Russia in the aftermath of its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 had a dramatic impact on the state’s economy. However, once sanctions are imposed, they are seldom removed. This obviously harms their utility as a coercive tool, as successful coercion requires that the target of the coercion trust that taking the course their opponent desires will result in the coercive action being reversed. However, this also harms the attritive potential of sanctions. Despite the dramatic pain that sanctions can cause, the targets of sanctions will always adapt and react to them. Thus, for attritive sanctions to work, they must remain dynamic and be willing to expand dramatically. The Iran sanctions became substantially more effective after secondary sanctions were imposed, while export controls on Russia since 2022 have been substantially weakened by third parties acting as conduits for dual use technologies(7). Thus, American policymakers need to be willing to constantly adjust and dramatically increase the scope of sanctions in response to changes in the target’s behavior. This reenforces the notion that sanctions should be used sparingly, but overwhelmingly. It also implies that sanctions should never be used as a tool for stigmatization, this is a function better served by diplomatic means.

9.     The implementation of a Powell Doctrine for sanctions would be an important first step to maximize their efficacy as a tool of statecraft and achieve American foreign policy ends, but it will not be enough. To truly take advantage of America’s financial might, sanctions policy must be systematized and involve a degree of planning that currently does not exist. The tendency to reflexively reach for sanctions has meant that they are often implemented in an ad hoc fashion. However, if sanctions are to be seen as a result-driven tool, and not a symbolic extension of American power, then policymakers will need to have a far deeper understanding of the options available to them, and the factors that will influence their success. This is an approach that the American government seems to be taking small steps towards embracing. Notably, in the runup to the Russian Invasion in 2022, American and European policymakers held a series of gatherings to preplan a response to an invasion, and signal resolve. Ironically, the sanctions that were imposed ended up being substantially stronger than the ones that were decided upon in these meetings(8). American officials should build off these efforts and begin investing the time and capital to preplan as much sanctions policy as possible.

10.   Just as the Pentagon has reams of plans for all potential adversaries and situations that may arise, the Treasury Department should begin building a comprehensive collection of policy options for future use. This will need to include contingency plans that consider the different countermeasures that adversaries may take. The benefits of such a shift would be myriad. The first is that it increases the credibility of the deterrent threat. Additionally, it would allow the U.S. to rapidly and decisively respond to the attempts of foes to minimize the effects of sanctions. Additionally, these plans must be created in conjunction with the State Department. This will serve two purposes. It will allow coordination with allies and other states, which is essential to the success of any sanctions regime. This point is highlighted by the fact that President Biden’s 2022 multilateral sanctions did not undermine the strength of the dollar, while President Trump’s 2018 unilateral sanctions did. Coordination with the State Department will also allow sanctions policy to integrate a deeper understanding of the political dynamics in the target country, so that their economic impact can translate into political pressure on decision makers, as it did in the case of the Obama administration’s policy towards Iran. To truly leverage the power of American foreign policy capabilities, sanctions must be integrated with diplomatic and military policy to create a single cohesive strategy towards any given geopolitical challenge.

11.   There are many areas of U.S. policy in which securitization is a concern and threatens to subsume the decision making of policymakers. Sanctions ironically, are an area in which a security mindset is severely lacking. The impacts of sanctions are closer to that of a naval blockade than a diplomatic statement. American officials must understand that their adversaries view sanctions as a weapon, and their implementation as an act of war. Thus, they should be treated and respected as such. American foreign policy will be improved by taking a more security-based approach to sanctions, in which they are used discriminately yet decisively within a clear strategic plan, that is oriented towards a discrete end goal. A new model for sanctions, based on the famed Powell Doctrine, which involves instituting a robust planning and contingency mechanism, is necessary. With this model, American officials can ensure that sanctions remain an effective and powerful tool that, when combined appropriately with military force and diplomacy, are able to further foreign policy. 

References:

1. Fishman, Edward. Chokepoints. Penguin, 25 Feb. 2025.

2. “United States Sanctions.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 18 Oct. 2024, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_sanctions#:~:text=United%20States%20sanctions%20are%20financial,policy%20or%20national%20security%20goals.

3. Dmalloy. “The Powell Doctrine’s Wisdom Must Live On.” Atlantic Council, 19 Oct. 2021, www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-powell-doctrines-wisdom-must-live-on/. 

4. Nephew, Richard. The Art of Sanctions : A View from the Field. New York, Columbia University Press, Cop, 2018.

5. Fishman, Edward. “Curbing Iran’s Nuclear Program.” Economic and Financial Statecraft. Columbia SIPA, September 18th, 2024.

6. Fishman, Edward. Chokepoints. Penguin, 25 Feb. 2025.

7. Baker, Joe. “Is China’s Cross-Border Payments Network on the Rise?” FXC Intelligence, 4 July 2025, www.fxcintel.com/research/analysis/cips-growth-may-2025.

8. Fishman, Edward. “Responding to Russia’s Aggression (Part I).” Economic and Financial Statecraft. Columbia SIPA, September 25th, 2024. IFI. “The Sanctions Evasion Threat.” Institute for Financial Integrity, 26 Nov. 2024, finintegrity.org/the-sanctions-evasion-threat/.